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Firm dataThe EU Emissions Trading Scheme continues to exempt industries deemed at risk of carbon leakage from permit
auctions. Carbon leakage risk is established based on the carbon intensity and trade exposure of each 4-digit
industry. Using a novel measure of carbon leakage risk obtained in interviews with almost 400 managers at
regulated ﬁrms in six countries, we show that carbon intensity is strongly correlated with leakage risk whereas
overall trade exposure is not. In spite of this, most exemptions from auctioning are granted to industries with
high trade exposure to developed and less developed countries. Our analysis suggests two ways of tightening
the exemption criteriawithout increasing relocation risk among non-exempt industries. The ﬁrst one is to exempt
trade exposed industries only if they are also carbon intensive. The second one is to consider exposure to trade only
with less developed countries. By modifying the carbon leakage criteria along these lines, European governments
could raise additional revenue from permit auctions of up to €3 billion per year, based on a permit price of €30.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction
It is widely recognized that the problem of carbon leakage poses a
major challenge for designing effective unilateral policies aimed at miti-
gating global climate change. In its most direct manifestation, carbon
leakage occurswhenpolluting plants that are subject to climate policy re-
locate to an unregulated jurisdiction. Since carbon emissions are a global
pollutant, their “leaking” to unregulated places reduces the environmen-
tal beneﬁts from the policy. In addition, carbon leakage creates an excess
burden for those countries that regulate emissions to the extent that re-
location reduces output, employment, and taxable proﬁts at home.
Not surprisingly, carbon leakage takes the center stage whenever a
new climate change regulation is up for debate. So far, the most common
deterrent against carbon leakage has been to either compensate or tofor Climate Change, Imperial
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. This is an open access article underexempt those industries deemed to bemost adversely affected by the pol-
icy. For instance, virtually all of the numerous carbon taxes that have
emerged in Europe since the 1990's grant rebates or exemptions to
energy-intensive ﬁrms in order to prevent them from relocating.1 While
this practice may be justiﬁed from the point-of-view of industrial policy,
it runs counter to the polluter-pays principle underlying environmental
policy-making in the EU. It also gives way to rent-seeking behavior, as
regulated ﬁrms have an incentive to exaggerate their compliance costs
in order to receivemore generous compensation. Addressing carbon leak-
age is therefore a difﬁcult and controversial policy issue.
This paper empirically analyzes the current scheme to prevent car-
bon leakage implemented in the European Union Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS), the world's ﬁrst and largest regional cap-and-trade
system for greenhouse gas emissions. During the ﬁrst eight years of
the EU ETS, leakagewas addressed by offeringmanufacturingﬁrms gen-
erous compensation in the form of allocatingmost emission allowances1 Contrary to this view, a recent studyof theUKClimate Change Levyﬁnds no causal im-
pact of carbon taxation on output, employment or plant exit among manufacturing ﬁrms
(Martin et al., 2014a).
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
2 Cf. Commission Decision 2010/2/EU determining, pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council, a list of sectors and subsectors which are
deemed to be exposed to a signiﬁcant risk of carbon leakage (2010) OJ L 1/10 (Carbon Leak-
age Decision).
3 This deterrent for carbon leakage hinges on free allowance allocation and hence loses
bite during the transition to full auctioning, unless low carbon innovation creates a lock-in
effect (Schmidt and Heitzig, 2014).
4 Extending an earlier work by Demailly and Quirion (2006) on the cement sector,
Monjon and Quirion (2011) use a computable partial equilibriummodel to compare bor-
der adjustments and output based allocation. They ﬁnd that themost efﬁcient way to pre-
vent carbon leakage in the EU ETS is by combining full auctioning of emission allowances
with border adjustments. In a theoretical analysis, Meunier et al. (2012) show that a com-
bination of output based and capacity based allowance allocation is second-best when
border adjustments are not available.
5 Notice that making permit allocation contingent on the ﬁrm's decisions at the extensive
(continuedoperation) or intensivemargins (output) leads tooutcomesno longer being inde-
pendent of the initial permit allocation. As Hahn and Stavins (2011) note, this ‘independence
property’ of emissions trading follows from the Coase theorem under certain conditions (a
competitive permitmarket, rational behavior, and lack of transaction costs, regulatory uncer-
tainty or credit constraints). In a recent study of the RECLAIMprogram in Southern California,
Fowlie and Perloff (2013) test and cannot reject the hypothesis that plant-level abatement of
nitrogen oxides was independent of the permit allocation. For the EU ETS, Reguant and
Ellerman (2008) obtain a similar ﬁnding in a study of Spanish electricity generators. In con-
trast, Abrell et al. (2011) ﬁnd some evidence that the EU ETS increased employment at ﬁrms
that received allowances in excess of their veriﬁed emissions.
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until 2020, the European Commission (EC) gradually reduces the pro-
portion of free allowances allocated to manufacturing ﬁrms. At the
same time, and contrary to its stated objective of achieving full auction-
ing of emission allowances, the EC exempts from this transition more
than three quarters of the regulated emissions from manufacturing, on
the grounds that the ﬁrms accounting for those emissions are at risk
of carbon leakage. Exemptions are granted according to two simple
criteria, namely the carbon intensity of value added and trade exposure,
both measured at the level of the 4-digit industry code.
Our paper assesses the accuracy of these criteria based on a novel
ﬁrm-level measure of leakage risk we gathered in telephone interviews
with managers of 390 manufacturing ﬁrms in six European countries
which are regulated under the EU ETS. The ﬂexibility of the interview
based approach, along with the bias-reducing format of the survey
tool developed by Bloom and VanReenen (2007) and adapted to the cli-
mate policy context in Martin et al. (2012, 2014b), allows us to elicit
valuable information on politically contentious issues such as a ﬁrm's
vulnerability to carbon pricing, deﬁned as the ﬁrm's propensity to
downsize or relocate in response to climate change policy.
We show that carbon intensity is strongly correlated with our
interview-based measure of vulnerability whereas trade intensity is not.
This is a reason for concern because most exemptions from auctioning
are granted on the basis of the trade intensity criterion alone.We propose
two simple improvements to the exemption criteria, based on the princi-
ple that free permits should only be given to industrieswhere the average
relocation propensity is signiﬁcantly higher than that of non-exempt in-
dustries. First, by not exempting trade intensive sectors but the ones
that are at least moderately carbon intensive as well, European govern-
ments could raise additional auction revenue of up to €3 billion every
year, based on the carbon price of 30€/tCO2 which is used in the ofﬁcial
economic analysis that justiﬁes the leakage criteria (EU Commission,
2009). Alternatively, we show that a sector's intensity of trade with less
developed countries such as China is a better proxy for vulnerability
than the overall trade intensity. A change in the current trade intensity
criterion along these lines could raise €430 million in auction revenues
per year in addition to the revenue under the current auction rules.
In extending the normative analysis of industry compensation rules
in the EU ETS by Martin et al. (2014b), this paper contributes further ev-
idence of practical value on this controversial aspect of climate policy.
This will be relevant for the impending revision of the carbon leakage
criteria by the EUCommission, but ourﬁndings also informclimate policy
far beyond the European context. This is because criteria similar to the
ones used by the EChave been adopted in actual and proposed legislation
underlying half a dozen regional carbon trading schemes worldwide. For
instance, emission intensity and trade intensity are used to determine el-
igibility for compensation in the recently implemented carbon trading
schemes in California and Switzerland, in Australia's Carbon Pollution Re-
duction Scheme and inNew Zealand's ETS.Moreover, thesemetricswere
proposed for a USwide cap-and-trade schemeunder the 2009Waxman–
Markey Bill, and will be applied in a future South Korean ETS (http://
www.ieta.org/worldscarbonmarkets). In view of this, it is worth-
while to study how these criteria relate to leakage risk, as assessed by
the very managers who decide on relocation.
The next section describes the policy background and summarizes
the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and explains
our regression based test. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5
discusses their implications for the auction revenues forgone by the ac-
tual policy. Section 6 concludes.
2. Policy Background: Carbon Leakage and the EU ETS
2.1. Carbon Leakage
Although the objective of the EU ETS is themitigation of a global en-
vironmental problem, the policy limits greenhouse gas emissions onlyin the EU — not globally. In the Carbon Leakage Decision,2 the
European Commission acknowledges that this “could lead to an in-
crease in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry
would not be subject to comparable carbon constraints (‘carbon leak-
age’) and undermine the environmental integrity and beneﬁt of actions
by the Union”. Matthes (2008) distinguishes between two forms of
leakage. Investment leakage occurs in the medium-to-long run as
ﬁrms do not expand their production facilities in Europe or fail to rein-
vest in facilities that have reached the end of their economic lifetime.
Operational leakage denotes the short-termphenomenon of production
activity being decreased or shut down completely in Europe and its pos-
sible relocation to other countrieswithout carbon pricing. Since our em-
pirical analysis relies on interviews with managers of existing facilities,
the results are most pertinent to operational leakage.
The evident economic solution to the leakage problem is to adjust
the price of goods for the implicit carbon cost when they cross the bor-
der (see e.g. Monjon and Quirion, 2010). However, such border adjust-
ments – in addition to raising a number of practical issues –may collide
with the rules of the World Trade Organization (e.g. Jouré et al., 2013;
Quirion andMonjon, 2011). The EU ETS has been relying on free permit
allocation as the principal instrument to avoid leakage. Incentives for in-
vestment leakage are mitigated by granting free emission permits to
new facilities (the EU ETS sets aside permits for this purpose in a ‘new
entrant reserve’). Conversely, all freely allocated emission allowances
are canceledwhen a regulated facility closes, thereby penalizing operat-
ing leakage. If properly designed and enforced, this plant closure provi-
sion deters carbon leakage because free allocation is contingent on the
continued activity of the plant.3 The drawback of this is a distortion of
productive efﬁciency because free permits act like an output subsidy
(Fischer and Fox, 2007; Quirion, 2009, discusses this in the EU ETS con-
text).4 Speciﬁcally, the plant closure provisionmay render the operation
of otherwise inefﬁcient plants proﬁtable (Matthes and Monjon, 2008).52.2. Permit Allocation
In phases I and II of the EU ETS, eachmember state drewupaNation-
al Allocation Plan (NAP) that ﬁxed the national cap and determined the
sectoral permit allocation. In developing their NAPs in phase I most of
the countries opted for “grandfathering”, i.e. free permit allocations
based on historical emissions (Ellerman et al., 2007). In phase II, the
member states imposed more stringent caps so as to honor their com-
mitment to the EU's joint emission target under the Kyoto Protocol,
but they also retained free allocation. Auctioning fell far short of what
80 R. Martin et al. / Ecological Economics 105 (2014) 78–88was allowed, and benchmarking remained an exception (Ellerman and
Joskow, 2008).
Since the beginning of phase III, the allocation of all allowances has
been relegated from national governments back to Brussels. The
amended Emissions Trading Directive 2009/29/EC6 advances the transi-
tion toward full auctioning of permits as the basic principle of allocation
and stipulates a harmonized allocation scheme to reduce competitive
distortions among producers of similar products across member states.
The twomain features that lead theway to this scheme are (i) the use of
benchmarks which rewards operators who have taken early action to
reduce the emission intensity of production, and (ii) the continued
free allocation to sectors considered at risk of carbon leakage.7 To the
extent possible, benchmarks are deﬁned in tons of CO2 equivalent per
unit of output of a speciﬁc product.8 They reﬂect the average green-
house gas emission performance of the 10% best performing installa-
tions in the EU producing that product, based on the average emission
intensity in 2007–2008.9 The amount of free permits is obtained bymul-
tiplying the benchmark with the historical reference activity level, de-
ﬁned as the median activity level over the years from 2005 until 2008
(or from 2009 until 2010, if larger). Total allocations calculated in this
way are scaled by a factor that takes a value of 0.8 in 2013 and declines
linearly to a factor of 0.3 in 2020.10 This factor is meant to accomplish
the gradual transition to full auctioning foreseen already in the original
Emissions Trading Directive 2003/87/EC.
2.3. Carbon Leakage Sectors
To mitigate the competitiveness impacts of permit auctioning, the
European Commission grants 100% of benchmark allocations for free
to ﬁrms in sectors that are considered at risk of carbon leakage. The Car-
bon Leakage Decision stipulates that leakage risk of a sector or subsector
be assessed on the basis of its carbon intensity (CI) and/or trade inten-
sity (TI). The former proxies for the cost burden imposed by full auction-
ing, and ismeasured as the sumof the direct and indirect costs of permit
auctioning, divided by the gross value added of a sector. The direct costs
are calculated as the value of direct CO2 emissions, where a proxy price
of 30€/tCO2 is used. Indirect costs measure the exposure to electricity
price increases that are inevitable on account of full permit auctioning
in the power sector. To calculate indirect costs, electricity consumption
(in MWh) is multiplied by the average emission intensity of electricity
generation in the EU27 countries (0.465 tCO2/MWh), and by the same
proxy price of 30€/tCO2 for one European Union Allowance. The TImet-
ric is calculated as “the ratio between the total value of exports to third
countries plus the value of imports from third countries and the total
market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports
from third countries)” (EU Commission, 2009, p. 24).
In addition, a combinationof thresholds for CI andTI is used to establish
carbon leakage risk. For a sector to be considered at signiﬁcant risk of
carbon leakage, its CI must be greater than 5% and its TI must be greater
than 10%, or else its CI or TI is greater than 30%. Following this, we clas-
sify carbon leakage sectors into four mutually exclusive categories:116 Cf. Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas
emission allowance trading scheme of the Community (2009) OJ L 140/63 (Emissions
Trading Directive).
7 Recall that the focus of this paper is on the manufacturing sector. Operators in the
power generation sector no longer receive any free allowances, although some exceptions
to this apply in eight of the member states that have joined the EU since 2004.
8 Where deriving a product benchmark is not feasible, a hierarchy of fallback ap-
proaches is applied, as explained in detail by Sartor et al. (forthcoming).
9 Cf. Commission Decision 2011/87/EU determining transitional Union-wide rules for
harmonized free allocation of emission allowances pursuant to Article 10a of Directive
2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (2011) OJ L 130/1
(Benchmarking Decision).
10 Furthermore, a uniform correction factor is applied if necessary to align the total free
allocation to benchmarked installations with the overall cap on emissions.
11 This follows Directive 2009/29/EC's categorization except that category B is here fur-
ther divided in two.• A: high carbon intensity (CI N 30%),
• B1: high trade intensity and low carbon intensity (CI≤ 5% ∩ TI N 30%),
• B2: high trade intensity and moderate carbon intensity (5% bCI ≤ 30%
∩ TI N 30%),
• C: moderate carbon and trade intensities (5% b CI ≤ 30% ∩ 10% bTI ≤
30).
Fig. 1 plots the location of 4-digit sectors in a diagram with CI on
the vertical axis and TI on the horizontal axis.12 Two facts are imme-
diate from this graph: First, category B1 contains most of the sectors
the EC considers at risk of carbon leakage. Second, most of these
carbon leakage sectors are not carbon intensive at all, as their carbon
intensity is less than 5%. Fig. 2 plots the relative size of the resulting
ﬁve categories in terms of the shares in the number of ﬁrms, in
employment and in CO2 emissions.13 B2 is the largest group of
exempted ﬁrms in terms of employment, but B1 has the largest
share of exempted emissions. The share of CO2 emissions that is
not exempt from auctioning amounts to only 15% of permits surren-
dered on average in 2007 and 2008. Using an alternative approach,
Juergens et al. (2013) obtain a somewhat higher estimate of 23%.14
Both these estimates highlight that the Carbon Leakage Decision
leaves most pollution rights with European industry, not tax payers,
and hence undermines the principle of full auctioning established in
the amended ETS directive.
In view of such far-reaching distributive consequences, it is impera-
tive that the criteria for identifying carbon leakage sectors be as accurate
as possible. This aspect has receivedmuch less attention in the econom-
ic literature thus far than the analysis of policy instruments to prevent
leakage discussed in Subsection 2.1 above.15 Ex ante evaluations have
suggested that the EU ETS adversely impacts on production in most
regulated industrieswhile rising electricity prices lower the proﬁtability
of highly exposed industries such as primary aluminumproduction (e.g.
Demailly and Quirion, 2008; Reinaud, 2005). These studies also show
that free permit allocation offsets negative proﬁt impacts inmost indus-
tries, and can even lead to overcompensation (Smale et al., 2006). In a
reviewof this literature, Sato et al. (2007) propose to use trade intensity,
carbon intensity and electricity intensity as proxies for the competitive-
ness impact of the EU ETS.
There is, however, little empirical evidence to date that directly
links cross-sector variability in CI and TI to heterogeneity in the relo-
cation response to carbon pricing. In fact, a nascent literature on the
ex-post analysis of the impact of the EU ETS on international compet-
itiveness (reviewed in detail by Martin et al., 2013) does not suggest
that industrial ﬁrms on the whole suffered strong adverse impacts
when permits were allocated for free in the ﬁrst years of the EU
ETS (e.g. Abrell et al., 2011; Bushnell et al., 2013; Chan et al., 2013;
Commins et al., 2011; Petrick and Wagner, 2014; Wagner et al.,
2013).
In a recent paper,Martin et al. (2014b) analyze the link between free
allowance allocation in the EU ETS and carbon leakage. In taking a12 Similar graphical representations have been used by Clò (2010) and Martin et al.
(2014b). The EUTL–ORBIS data used here are described in Subsection 3.1.
13 As described in Subsection 3.1, installation-level data is aggregated at the ﬁrm level
and only ﬁrms for which employment and sector are available are kept in the sample.
14 Thediscrepancybetween their estimate and ours arises because theirs is basednot on-
ly on data from EUTL and the Impact Assessment Report accompanying the Carbon Leak-
age Decision (EU Commission, 2009), but also on conﬁdential data on CO2 emissions
which the member states made available to the EC but which are not available to us. It
is likely that the true value lies somewhere in between these ﬁgures.
15 Another strand of the literature assesses aggregate leakage effects by calibrating com-
putable general equilibriummodels that are capable of predicting the consequences of dif-
ferential carbon pricing across regions. Branger andQuirion (2014) review 25 studies from
2004 to 2012 and report that typical carbon leakage estimates range from5% to 25%. These
ﬁgures do not speak, however, to the leakage risk in speciﬁc industries, which is the focus
of this paper.
17 The criteria deﬁning sectors at risk of carbon leakage were published on June 5, 2009
(Directive 2009/29/EC), i.e. two months before the ﬁrst interviews were conducted. It is
therefore possible that some managers correctly anticipated that they would receive free
permits, and that this could have biased their reported VS. Martin et al. (2014b) test and
cannot reject the hypothesis that the available information on free permit allocation did
not inﬂuence the responses to the hypothetical question underlying VS.
18 We thank Rafael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre for graciously providing us with
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Fig. 1. Sectors exempt from permit auctions. Notes: The ﬁgure shows a scatter plot of the
carbon and trade intensities of 4-digit (NACE 1.1) manufacturing industries, based on
9061 EU ETS installations. The size of the circles is proportional to the number of ﬁrms
in a given industry. Sectors in areas A, B1, B2 and Cwill continue to be exempt from permit
auctions in EU ETS phase III.
Source: Martin et al. (2014b)
81R. Martin et al. / Ecological Economics 105 (2014) 78–88normative approach to this issue, they propose that free allowances
should be distributed across ﬁrms so as to minimize leakage, subject
to a given amount of foregone auction revenue. They conduct numerical
simulations of the efﬁciency gains of the resulting allocation rule. The
focus of the present paper is on the positive analysis of the accuracy of
the carbon leakage criteria, and on providing simple rules for improving
them.
3. Data and Methods
3.1. Data
We use a unique ﬁrm-level dataset constructed by Martin et al.
(2014b) for analyzing the link between permit allocation and the risk
of carbon leakage. A key ingredient of this dataset is a measure of a
ﬁrm's propensity to downsize or relocate in response to carbon pricing,
collected from 770 interviews with managers of 761 manufacturing
ﬁrms in six European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary,
Poland and the UK. The interviews ran from late August until early No-
vember 2009, and 429 of them were with ETS ﬁrms. As in Bloom and
Van Reenen (2007), interviews were conducted over the telephone
and follow a protocol intended to minimize cognitive bias. This was
achieved by asking managers open-ended questions and having the in-
terviewers score the answer to each question according to a common
benchmark. The large sample size and interviewer rotation mean that
it is possible to control for possible bias on the part of the interviewers,
e.g. by including interviewerﬁxed effects in regression analysis (see also
Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010). More details on the interview process
and ﬁrms' characteristics are provided in Martin et al. (2014b).16
Our empirical analysis focuses on the managers' response to the
question: “Do you expect that government efforts to put a price on car-
bon emissions will force you to outsource part of the production of this
business site in the foreseeable future, or to close down completely?” In-
terviewers recorded the answer as an ordinal ‘vulnerability score’ (VS)
which ranges from 1 to 5. The highest score of 5 was assigned if the
manager expected the plant to be closed completely, whereas the low-
est score of 1was given if themanager expected no detrimental impacts16 For instance, the web appendix to Martin et al. (2014b) corroborates that ﬁrms were
contacted at random, and that there was no selection on observable characteristics in a
ﬁrm's decision to concede an interview when contacted.at all. A score of 3was assigned if themanager expected that at least 10%
of production and/or employment would be outsourced in response to
future policies. Scores of 2 or 4 were given to account for intermediate
responses. Table 1 presents the empirical distribution of the vulnerabil-
ity score (VS) for the cross-section of 390 interviewedﬁrms that are part
of the EU ETS and for which data on both carbon intensity and regional
trade intensity are available.17
Martin et al. (2014b) note that none of the principal manufacturing
industries in the sample exhibit a signiﬁcant risk of ﬁrm relocation or
closure. Only Other Minerals has an average score slightly above 3,
and for a few sectors, including Iron and Steel, Ceramics, Glass, and
Fuels, the 95% conﬁdence interval includes a score of 3. In no case
does the 95% conﬁdence interval around the point estimates include
themaximum score,meaning that the possibility of complete relocation
in response to carbon pricing seemed very unlikely at the time the inter-
views were conducted (Martin et al.,2014b).
The interview data are augmented with “hard” data on employment
and turnover from the ORBIS database (Bureau Van Dijk, 1999–
2008), which also provides information on 4-digit NACE codes. A
mapping from the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL, formerly
known as CITL; EU Commission, 2005–2010) to ORBIS by Calel and
Dechezleprêtre (forthcoming) allows us to match ﬁrms and coun-
tries that are not included in our interviews.18 This results in a sam-
ple of 9061 installations (5037 ﬁrms) which account for 75% of EUTL
installations and 76% of surrendered CO2 allowances. The EUTL con-
tains data on emissions and allocations for phases I and II. Employ-
ment and sectoral NACE rev 1.1 classiﬁcation are available for 4254
ﬁrms, of which 3810 are manufacturing ﬁrms. Data from EUROSTAT
(2010a, b, c) were used to reproduce as closely as possible the EC's
calculation of the sector-level variables CI and TI. Finally, ﬁrm-
level data on permit allocations for phase III was obtained from
the National Implementation Measures (NIM).19 For a more com-
prehensive description of the dataset, the interested reader is re-
ferred to Martin et al. (2014b), which also contains further
evidence that the VS is a reliable measure of ﬁrms' downsizing risk.
3.2. A Regression Based Test
To evaluate the accuracy of the EC's carbon leakage criteria, we ex-
amine how they correlatewith VS. In particular, CI and TI should be pos-
itively correlated with VS. We test this hypothesis by estimating partial
correlations in a regression framework that controls for possible con-
founders at the ﬁrm and sector levels. The basic regression equation is
given by
VSi;s;c ¼ β0 þ βTTIs þ βCCIs þ x0i;s;cβx þ δc þ εi;s;c ð1Þ
where VSi,s,c is the vulnerability score of ﬁrm i in sector s and country c,
TIs and CIs are the trade and carbon criteria at the sector level, and xi,s,c is
a vector including higher order terms of these variables and interviewer
ﬁxed effects to control for possible bias on the part of the interviewers.
Moreover, we control for interview noise due to the manager's
characteristics — by including the tenure in the company, dummies
for gender and professional background (technical or law) – and dueNACE code identiﬁers and employment data based on their mapping.
19 We thank Oliver Sartor, Stephen Lecourt and Clément Pallière for kindly providing us
with the data for 20 of these countries, forwhich they collected andmatched theNIMdata
on free permit allocation to ORBIS (Sartor et al., forthcoming). We complemented this
datasetwith theNIMdata for Belgium andHungary,whichwematched to ORBIS by hand.
In total, this results in a sample of nearly 8000 installations covering 95% of the emissions.
20 Clustering standard errors at the 3-digit NACE code level does not warrant any chang-
es to the inference drawn below.
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Source: Martin et al. (2014b)
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the vulnerability score.
Mean Standard deviation Min P25 Median P75 Max Firms
Overall vulnerability score 2.15 1.46 1 1 1 3 5 390
A. By country
Belgium 1.86 1.21 1 1 1 3 5 74
France 2.15 1.47 1 1 1 4 5 88
Germany 2.53 1.72 1 1 1 5 5 85
Hungary 1.71 1.12 1 1 1 3 4 34
Poland 2.37 1.48 1 1 2 4 5 54
UK 2.00 1.33 1 1 1 3 5 55
B. By 3-digit sector
Cement 2.50 1.56 1 1 2 4 5 54
Ceramics 2.80 1.79 1 1 3 4 5 5
Chemical & Plastic 2.15 1.42 1 1 1 3 5 66
Fabricated Metals 2.33 1.15 1 1 3 3 3 3
Food & Tobacco 1.71 1.16 1 1 1 2 5 68
Fuels 2.71 1.59 1 1 3 4 5 14
Furniture & NEC 1.00 1 1 1 1 1 1
Glass 2.82 1.56 1 1 3 4 5 28
Iron & Steel 3.00 1.60 1 1 3 5 5 23
Machinery & Optics 1.56 1.13 1 1 1 1 4 9
Other Basic Metals 1.50 0.84 1 1 1 2 3 6
Other Minerals 3.29 1.80 1 1 3 5 5 7
Publishing 1.20 0.45 1 1 1 1 2 5
TV Communication 2.00 2.00 1 1 1 3 5 4
Textile & Leather 1.67 1.63 1 1 1 1 5 6
Vehicles 1.55 1.06 1 1 1 1 4 22
Wood & Paper 1.93 1.41 1 1 1 3 5 69
Notes: Summary statistics of the overall vulnerability score (ﬁrst row), by country (panel A) and by 3-digit NACE sector (panel B). The score ranges from 1 (no impact) to 5 (complete
relocation). A score of 3 is given if at least 10% of production of employment would be outsourced in response to future carbon pricing. NEC: Not elsewhere classiﬁed.
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week and time of day (am/pm). As a robustness check, we also include
ﬁrm-level employment and capital. All speciﬁcations include a full set of
country dummies δc.
It could be argued that the continuous relationship between VS, CI
and TI imposed in these regressions is not appropriate for the EC's
threshold based approach. We thus modify Eq. (1) to include a set of
dummy variables representing the exemption categories (A, B, C)
deﬁned above instead of the continuous variables TI and CI.
VSi;s;c ¼ γ0 þ γAI i∈Af g þ γBI i∈Bf g þ γCI i∈Cf g þ x0i;s;cγx þ δc þ ηi;s;c: ð2Þ
The omitted category in this regression comprises all ﬁrms that are
not exempt under the Carbon Leakage Decision. We estimate theseregressions using ordinary least squares and calculate robust standard
errors which are clustered at the 4-digit NACE code level.204. Results
4.1. Baseline Speciﬁcations
Table 2 summarizes the results of various versions of regression
Eq. (1). In the univariate speciﬁcations, we ﬁnd a strong positive associ-
ation of VS with carbon intensity, but no statistically signiﬁcant associa-
tion with trade intensity. This result is robust when both measures are
Table 2
Vulnerability score and exemption criteria.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Vulnerability score (VS) VS N 2
Sectoral trade intensity (TI) −0.013 0.056 0.055 0.098 0.072 0.014 0.031
(0.093) (0.115) (0.097) (0.117) (0.111) (0.114) (0.110)
Carbon intensity (CI) 0.235*** 0.462** 0.295*** 0.475*** 0.448** 0.405* 0.390**
(0.060) (0.213) (0.089) (0.114) (0.220) (0.237) (0.194)
TI × TI 0.005 0.002 0.020 0.034
(0.075) (0.074) (0.073) (0.067)
CI × CI −0.039 −0.036 −0.024 −0.035
(0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.034)
TI × CI 0.050 0.078 0.060 0.056 0.083 0.048
(0.106) (0.091) (0.133) (0.103) (0.095) (0.093)
Employment (ln) −0.039 −0.082
(0.064) (0.079)
Capital (ln) 0.022
(0.043)
Weights No No No No Employment No No No
Observations 390 390 390 390 390 390 368 389
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 to 4 and 6 and 7, Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression in column 5, and Probit regression in column 8. The dataset is a cross-section of 390
interviewed ﬁrms that are part of the EU ETS and for which EUTL, sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. The dependent variable is the vulnerability score of the ﬁrm
given by the interview data. In column 5, the score is weighted by the ﬁrm's employment. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI indicates trade intensity which
are calculated using data from Eurostat and the EU Commission. × indicates that two variables are interacted. Employment and capital are averages over the years from 2005 to 2008,
taken from Orbis. Capital is measured as Fixed Assets and is not available for 22 ﬁrms of the sample. All regressions include a constant, interview noise controls and country dummies
(not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.
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fects of interactions and non-linearities. For instance, trade exposure
could matter for very high values of TI only, or only when it coincides
with high CI. There is no evidence of such effects, and the same conclu-
sion arises from a probit speciﬁcationwhere the dependent variable in-
dicates that the VS is larger than 2 (reported in column 8). Weighting
the regression Eq. (1) by employment does not change the qualitative
ﬁndings but gives rise to a larger estimate for the impact on CI. This sug-
gests that CI is a particularly good measure of the risk of downsizing
among large ﬁrms. In sum, our regression-based test reveals that TI is
not a good indicator to measure the risk of downsizing or outsourcing
whereas CI is.
We obtain similar results when looking at exemption categories. The
ﬁrst column of Table 3 reports the results obtained for Eq. (2). Only the
very carbon intensive group (A) has an average VS signiﬁcantly higher
than the reference category (ﬁrms that are not exempt from auctioning).Table 3
Vulnerability score and exemption categories.
(1) (2)
Vulnerability score
CI N 30 (A) 1.080*** 1.065***
(0.284) (0.291)
TI N 30 ∩ CI b 30 (B) 0.229
(0.259)
10 b TI b 30 ∩ 5 b CI b 30 (C) 0.119 0.136
(0.250) (0.244)
B ∩ CI b 5 (B1) −0.047
(0.244)
B ∩ CI N 5 (B2) 0.598*
(0.317)
Weights No No
Observations 390 390
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 2, WLS in column 3 and Probit regressions in columns
and for which EUTL, sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. The dependent var
regressions 1 to 3, and a dummy indicating whether the score is higher than 2 in regressions 4
dicates carbon intensity and TI indicates trade intensity, calculated using data from Eurostat an
categories A, B and C, as well as B1 and B2. These are used as explanatory variables. Columns 4
interview noise controls and country dummies (not reported). Robust standard errors, clustered
at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels.But even in group A there is no dramatically high risk of downsizing or
outsourcing for the average ﬁrm. The 95%-conﬁdence band for the VS
in group A just about includes the value of 3, which means a reduction
of at least 10% in production or employment due to outsourcing.
Taken together, the regression results obtained in Eqs. (1) and (2)
suggest that the efﬁciency of the allocation scheme could be enhanced
if the exemption criteria or associated thresholds were modiﬁed so as
to better reﬂect the true risk of carbon leakage. The next section con-
siders two simple modiﬁcations along these lines.4.2. Extensions
4.2.1. Modifying Intensity Thresholds
The result that the average VS in categoriesB and C is not signiﬁcant-
ly higher than in sectors not exempt from auctioning suggests(3) (4) (5)
Vulnerability score N 2
2.015*** 0.757*** 1.726***
(0.510) (0.230) (0.440)
0.360 0.104 0.272
(0.241) (0.236) (0.292)
0.059 −0.060 0.125
(0.329) (0.235) (0.389)
1.033*** 0.508** 1.269***
(0.322) (0.252) (0.418)
Employment No Employment
390 390 390
4 and 5. The dataset is a cross-section of 390 interviewed ﬁrms that are part of the EU ETS
iable is the vulnerability score (on a scale of 5) of the ﬁrm given by the interview data in
and 5. In columns 3 and 5, the ﬁrm's employment is used to weight the regression. CI in-
d the EU Commission. Based on these, dummies are constructed to represent belonging to
and 5 report marginal effects of the probit regressions. All regressions include a constant,
by 4-digit NACE sector, are given in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance
Table 4
Vulnerability score and region-speciﬁc trade intensities.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Vulnerability score
Sectoral carbon intensity (CI) 0.239*** 0.419*** 0.555*** 0.553***
(0.057) (0.094) (0.167) (0.166)
Sectoral trade intensity (TI) with LESS developed countries 0.378** 0.606*** 0.701*** 1.456***
(0.164) (0.206) (0.231) (0.245)
TI with LEAST developed countries −0.229*** −0.313*** −0.421*** −0.739***
(0.076) (0.084) (0.157) (0.174)
TI with Developed non-EU countries 0.120 −0.019 −0.212 −0.593***
(0.125) (0.160) (0.243) (0.219)
TI with EU countries −0.234** −0.249* −0.417*** −0.682***
(0.114) (0.132) (0.142) (0.189)
(CI)2 −0.069** −0.092**
(0.030) (0.045)
(TI less)2 −0.152 −0.718***
(0.121) (0.131)
(TI least)2 0.046* 0.094***
(0.027) (0.029)
(TI developed)2 0.073 0.212***
(0.088) (0.074)
(TI EU)2 0.015 0.305***
(0.091) (0.110)
TI less × CI 0.400 0.237
(0.288) (0.426)
TI least × CI 0.700*** 0.760***
(0.209) (0.187)
TI developed × CI −0.783*** −0.686***
(0.232) (0.179)
TI EU × CI 0.152 0.058
(0.171) (0.223)
Weights No Employment No Employment
Observations 390 390 390 390
Notes: OLS regressions in columns 1 and 3.WLS regression in columns 2 and 4. The dataset is a cross section of 390 interviewed ﬁrms that are part of the EU ETS and for which EUTL data,
carbon intensity data and geographically precise sectoral trade and carbon intensity data are available. Robust standard errors, clustered by 4-digit NACE sector, are given in parentheses.
Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) levels. Includes a constant, country dummies and interview noise controls (not reported). The dependent var-
iable is the vulnerability score of the ﬁrm given by the interview data. As explanatory variables, CI indicates carbon intensity and TI indicates trade intensity which are calculated from
Eurostat and the EU Commission data. × indicates that the two variables are interacted.
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raise the overall relocation risk. However, category B is very heteroge-
neous. While most sectors in this category are not carbon intensive at
all (CI b 5), there is a small number of sectors with an intermediate car-
bon intensity (5 b CI b 30), as shown in Fig. 1. In order to account for this
heterogeneity, we subdivide category B into a group with low CI (B1)
and one with intermediate CI (B2).
When these separate groups are included alongwith groupsA and C
in regression Eq. (2), the more carbon-intensive sectors in group B ex-
hibit a signiﬁcantly higher risk of outsourcing than the reference
group, even though, as is the case for group A, the risk of downsizing
or closure does not attain very high levels for the average ﬁrm
(cf. columns 2 and 3 of Table 3). This result holds up when the regres-
sion is weighted by employment. In fact, the coefﬁcient estimates on
groups A and B2 both become stronger, indicating that some of the larg-
er ﬁrms in those categories are at a higher leakage risk.
In order to account for the qualitative difference between a slight
increase in downsizing risk and a strong downsizing impact, we also es-
timate Probit regressions of the binary event that a ﬁrm has a VS of 3 or
larger. The results, reported in columns 4 and 5 of Table 3, conﬁrm that
only groups A and B2 present some risk of downsizing. It would there-
fore seem justiﬁed to adjust the thresholds for exemption accordingly.21 The full list of countries is reported in theAppendix. The grouping follows the 2011UN
classiﬁcation, available online at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.
htm#developed.4.2.2. Reﬁning the Trade Intensity Deﬁnition
We have found that the TI criterion is of limited value for proxying a
sector's actual downsizing risk. One reason for this could be that this in-
dicator is not precise enough to capture how exposure to international
markets affects downsizing risk. For example, being exposed tocompetition from China might affect a ﬁrm's competitiveness in a very
different way than does competition from Australia. Moreover, being
export intensive could have different implications than being import in-
tensive. In order to explore whether a reﬁned TI measure would give a
better indicator of carbon leakage risk, we regress VS on CI and four sep-
arate measures of the intensity of trade with (i) least developed coun-
tries, (ii) less developed (or developing) countries including China and
India, (iii) developed non-EU countries and (iv) EU countries.21 These
measures are based on ﬁgures for the years between 2005 and 2007.
Table 4 summarizes the results of these regressions. Column 1 re-
veals a strong positive association between vulnerability and TI with
less developed countries, which include China and other countries
that tend to have less stringent environmental regulation standards
and which compete with European manufacturing ﬁrms. The relation-
ship between vulnerability and TIwith least developed countries is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant. This could reﬂect a lack of competition from such
countries as they tend to export agricultural products and natural re-
sources rather than manufactured goods. High TI with EU countries is
negatively associated with the VS. This is consistent with ﬁrms antici-
pating that their EU competitors will be subject to the same policy con-
straints. The ﬁndings obtained in the quadratic form, which includes
interactions of TI with CI and squared terms, are qualitatively similar
(column 3). In addition, TI with other developed countries outside the
85R. Martin et al. / Ecological Economics 105 (2014) 78–88EU only matters in interaction with high CI, in which case vulnerability
is lower. Conversely, the negative link between vulnerability and TI for
the least developed countries is partially offset for the most carbon in-
tensive ﬁrms. The employment-weighted regressions (columns 2 and
4) show qualitatively similar results. The most striking difference is
that the coefﬁcient for trade with less developed countries is almost
twice as large as in columns 1 and 3. This suggests that using a regionally
disaggregated TI measure to assess vulnerability would be particularly
important when the objective is to prevent job leakage.
In further speciﬁcations, reported in Table 5, we decompose the TI
measure into export intensity (EI) and import intensity (II). The ﬁrst
column shows that these variables on their own are not strongly corre-
lated with VS. Columns 2 and 3 reveal an interesting heterogeneity. For
the unweighted equation in column2, the import intensitywith less de-
veloped countries becomes signiﬁcant, whereas for the employment-
weighted regression it is the export intensity that is more strongly asso-
ciated with a high VS. However, in both cases the point estimates for
both import and export intensities are positive, suggesting that the
speciﬁcations in Table 4 which consider overall trade intensity, are a
reasonable simpliﬁcation.24 This is done in two steps. First, for each EUTL sector in each of the 22 countries, extra5. Discussion
Our analysis of the correlation between ameasure of carbon leakage
risk based on managers' responses, and the carbon leakage criteria ap-
plied by the EC has revealed that carbon intensity is a good proxy for
leakage risk whereas trade intensity is not. This mismatch gives rise to
overly generous compensation in the form of free permits granted to
trade-exposed industries that are not really at risk of relocating due to
carbon pricing. Based on our results, we have identiﬁed two simple
modiﬁcations of the carbon leakage criteria that might inform the EC's
impending review of carbon leakage sectors, scheduled for 2014. The
ﬁrst one is to consider trade intensive sectors at risk only if they are
also carbon intensive. The second modiﬁcation suggests the adoption
of a more speciﬁc TI measure which is based on trade only with less de-
veloped countries rather than with all non-EU countries.
If exemptions from permit auctioning were granted according to
these modiﬁed criteria, more emission permits could be auctioned
without a signiﬁcant increase in leakage risk. Given the scale of the EU
ETS, it is worthwhile to perform a back-of-the-envelope calculation of
the resulting increase in auction revenue. To this end, we compile
installation-level data on benchmarking allocations, available for 22
countries, and match the information on the NACE industry code,
which is needed to assign installations to exemption groups. When
computing the amount of emissions no longer exempt from auctioning
under an alternative rule, we take into account that installations in non-
exempt sectors get free permits for only 80% instead of 100% of their
benchmark emissions in 2013, and that this proportion falls linearly to
30% until 2020. The results of this exercise are reported in Table 6.
Consider ﬁrst a modiﬁcation of the carbon intensity threshold for
trade intensive sectors, as described above. Table 7 lists all sectors that
would cease to be exempt from auctioning under this proposal. For
our sample, we calculate that thiswould yield an additional 82.3 million
emission rights to be auctioned on average per year. The bootstrapped
conﬁdence intervals at the 95% level indicate that the sampling error
surrounding this estimate interval is quite small.22 The point estimate
is a lower bound as it does not include (i) a small proportion of installa-
tions that could not be matched to industry codes and (ii) installations
in seven countries for which the NIM data were not publicly available.23
Using aggregate data on emissions in 2009, we scale up the initial esti-
mate to the entire EU ETS and obtain a total of 100.3 million permits22 The bootstrap with resampling is based on 200 replications.
23 Czech Republic, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Malta, Norway and Slovenia.to be auctioned.24 Finally, we translate emissions into revenues using
two alternative allowance prices. The higher price of 30 is considered
in keeping with the price used by the EU Commission (2009) to calcu-
late the carbon intensity of value added. A lower price of 5 is closer to
the market price observed during 2012 and 2013. This leads to an esti-
mate of additional auction revenue of either 0.5 billion or 3 billion per
year, with an uncertainty of ±15%.
When the exemption categories are maintained but TI with less de-
veloped countries is used instead of overall TI, the increase in auction
revenue is lower, 71 million to 430 million per year, depending on the
allowance price, and estimated somewhat less precisely. While these
revenue estimates are also subject to uncertainty about future carbon
emissions and allowance prices, their order of magnitude shows that
the EU is prepared to hand out proﬁt subsidies to polluting ﬁrms on
an enormous scale without getting anything in return. This is in line
with the ﬁndings by Martin et al. (2014b) who compare free permit al-
location under the Carbon Leakage Decision to counterfactual scenarios
that (i)minimize the total leakage risk subject to amaximumamount of
free permits or (ii) minimize the amount of free permits subject to a
maximum tolerable leakage risk. Like the present paper, they ﬁnd a
large potential for improving the efﬁciency of compensation offered to
avoid leakage, even when compensation rules are based on relatively
simple criteria, such as ﬁrm-level employment or carbon emissions.
Their normative approach is based on the gradient of the vulnerability
scorewith respect to free permits,whereas in the present paperwe sug-
gest simple improvements based on the correlation between the level of
the vulnerability score and the carbon leakage criteria.
6. Conclusion
While auctioning is poised to become the predominant scheme for
allocating emission permits during the current third trading phase of
the EU ETS, free allocation continues at a substantial scale. The evidence
presented in this paper substantiates concerns that the European Com-
mission compensates polluting industries too generously at the expense
of European taxpayers. Clearly, subsidizing “carbon fat cats”25 in times
of deep cuts in public spending could undermine political support for
emissions trading. However, our analysis also points to a window of op-
portunity for European governments to improve the design of the EU
ETS signiﬁcantly while raising additional revenue in the hundreds of
millions of euros annually. Rather than providing an unspeciﬁc subsidy
for industry, governments could earmark this money to ﬁnance invest-
ments in infrastructure and R&D which are costly but crucial for the
transition to a low-carbon economy. Furthermore, part of the additional
revenue could be used to mitigate possibly regressive effects of higher
carbon prices on low-income groups. Not least, more permit revenue
would help to balance strained government budgets in those
European countries most affected by the grand recession.
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Vulnerability score and export–import intensities.
(1) (2) (3)
Vulnerability score
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Sectoral export intensity (EI) −0.071
(0.160)
Sectoral import intensity (II) 0.141
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Appendix
List of Countries
1.1. The Least Developed Countries
Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic
Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali,
Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa,
Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, Sudan, United Republic of Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo,
Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia.
1.2. The Less Developed or Developing Countries
Algeria, American Samoa, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cayman
Islands, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote
D'Ivoire, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Falkland Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Gabon, Georgia,
Ghana, Grenada, Guam, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan,
Kazakhstan, Kenya, North Korea, South Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lebanon, Libyan, Arab, Jamahiriya, Macao, Malaysia, Marshall, Islands
Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia,
Montserrat, Morocco, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, New Cale-
donia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Niue, NorthernMariana Islands, Occupied Pal-
estinian Territory, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Qatar, Saint Helena, Saudi Arabia,
Seychelles, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St Kitts And Nevis, St
Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian
Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Turks and Caicos Islands,
United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet-Nam,
Virgin Islands (US), Virgin Islands (UK), Wallis and Futuna, Zimbabwe.
6.0.2.3. The Developed Non-EU Countries
Albania, Andorra, Australia, Belarus, Bermuda, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Faroe Islands, Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Gibraltar, Greenland, Holy See, Iceland,
Japan, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro,
New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Saint Pierre andof free permit allocation,
ETS [MtCO2 eq]
Additional revenue with
price of €30 per ton [M€]
Additional revenue with
price of €5 per ton [M€]
3008.78 501.46
.54] [2,595.35; 3,466.17] [432.56; 577.69]
430.4 71.73
1] [284.11; 603.41] [47.35; 100.57]
different rule on average per year over 2013–2020. A, B1, B2 and C refer to the EU criteria
s in the deﬁnition of groups B and C. MtCO2 eq stands for millionmetric tons of CO2 equiv-
free permit allocation and additional revenue obtained from a bootstrap with resampling
Table 7
List of additional sectors not to be exempted from auctioning.
Sector description NACE sector code Sector description NACE sector code
Processing and preserving of ﬁsh and ﬁsh products 152 Manufacture and processing of other glass including technical glassware 2615
Manufacture of crude oils and fats 1541 Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for construction purposes; manufacture
of refractory ceramic
262
Manufacture of starches and starch products 1562 Manufacture of ceramic tiles and fags 263
Manufacture of sugar 1583 Production of abrasive products 2681
Manufacture of distilled potable alcoholic beverages 1591 Manufacture of tubes 272
Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials 1592 Precious metals production 2741
Manufacture of wines 1593 Lead, zinc and tin production 2743
Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages 1595 Manufacture of cutlery 2861
Preparation and spinning of woolen-type ﬁbers 1712 Manufacture of tools 2862
Preparation and spinning of worsted-type ﬁbers 1713 Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and springs 2874
Preparation and spinning of fax-type ﬁbers 1714 Manufacture of other fabricated metal products, n.e.c. 2875
Throwing and preparation of silk, including from noils, and throwing
and texturing of synthetic or artiﬁcial ﬁlament yarns
1715 Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, except aircraft,
vehicle and cycle engines
291
Manufacture of sewing threads 1716 Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners 2921
Preparation and spinning of other textile ﬁbers 1717 Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment 2923
Textile weaving 172 Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c. 2924
Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel 174 Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery 293
Manufacture of other textiles 175 Manufacture of machine-tools 294
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics 176 Manufacture of other special purpose machinery 295
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles 177 Manufacture of weapons and ammunition 296
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories 182 Manufacture of electric domestic appliances 2971
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur 183 Manufacture of ofﬁce machinery and computers 300
Tanning and dressing of leather 191 Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers 311
Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness 192 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 312
Manufacture of footwear 193 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 313
Sawmilling and planing of wood, impregnation of wood 201 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 314
Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials 2052 Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps 315
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard 211 Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c. 3162
Manufacture of wallpaper 2124 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 321
Other publishing 2215 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy 322
Manufacture of reﬁned petroleum products 232 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus
and associated goods
323
Processing of nuclear fuel 233 Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopedic appliances 331
Manufacture of dyes and pigments 2412 Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes,
except industrial process control equipment
332
Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products 242 Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment 334
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical
products
244 Manufacture of watches and clocks 335
Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations 2452 Building and repairing of ships and boats 351
Manufacture of essential oils 2463 Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft 353
Manufacture of photographic chemical material 2464 Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles 354
Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media 2465 Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c. 355
Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c. 2466 Manufacture of jewelry and related articles 362
Manufacture of man-made ﬁbers 247 Manufacture of musical instruments 363
Manufacture of rubber tires and tubes 2511 Manufacture of sports goods 364
Manufacture of ﬂat glass 2611 Manufacture of games and toys 365
Manufacture of hollow glass 2613 Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c. 366
Notes: The table lists sectors that are exempt from auctioning under the current carbon leakage criteria, butwould no longer be exempted under the ﬁrst of our proposed rule changes,which is to apply an additional carbon intensity threshold of 5% to
trade intensive industries. The list contains about half of the sectors currently exempted. The EC criteria apply at the 4 digit (NACE Rev. 1.1) sectoral level. For conciseness, we report the 3-digit sector if all 4-digit subsectors in a 3-digit sector would
cease to be exempted.
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